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The North Korea Diplomatic Disconnect: The Reconciliation of Soft and Hard Power
Well, I've thought quite a
bit about the situation with North Korea recently, and I've determined that
their continued brinkmanship is something that, should it go unaddressed, will
lead to one of two major outcomes: 1) A major conflict on the Korean peninsula
or 2) internal tensions leading to the destabilization of the regime and its
eventual end. While I've always felt that number two is inevitable, and will
likely occur before the end of the decade, the question is whether it will occur
with or without the advent of a major regional conflict. The thing that will
really determine the outcome in this situation is how the international
community, particularly the 5 powers that regularly attempt to negotiate with
the North, choose to engage the North over its various violations of established
understandings. Ultimately, this comes down to these parties resolving to
approach the situation through soft power, or through other options. Can soft
power by itself solve the issue?
Personally, I feel that it is never too late to negotiate, at least when dealing
with something like a nation state with a well-defined leadership structure.
However, because the North has been so unreliable when living up to its
commitments, and so many attempts have been made to encourage them to back away
from their confrontationalist attitude, I wonder if we are finding ourselves at
the point where some kind of intervention is needed, especially in the light of
the recent test and the threats made regarding the armistice.
Intervention? How would that be accomplished? This is the tricky part...how can
the international community or, at the least, a concerned super power, undertake
such a thing, what would it look like, and how could it be done in a safe way?
I really should clarify what I mean by "intervention." What I don't mean is
attacking the North and starting a conflict. I don't mean ratcheting up tensions
on the Korean peninsula. What I mean is more along the lines of finding ways to
reach out to elements of the North Korean regime, members of the inner circle
or, at the least, high ranking members of the party. Failing in that, there
should be some kind of attempt to make contact with and assist those who have
been abandoned by the staunch regime supporters in Pyongyang: the thousands who
currently find themselves in concentration camps, and the millions whose
suffering is arguably the same...the starving rural poor. Again, the key is
doing so in a clandestine way, a way that does not raise the prospect of a
conflict.